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Erdogan Just Used The Syrian Conflict. By Manish Rai
For quite some time now tensions have been rising in Syrian opposition-held areas over Turkish moves towards rapprochement with Syria. The recent violence against Syrians in Turkey acted as a catalyst and sparked retaliatory riots in opposition-held areas of northwestern Syria. Hundreds of Syrian demonstrators, some armed, took to the streets in protest. Some tore down Turkish flags, hurled rocks and targeted Turkish commercial trucks. In recent days, anger has boiled over and anti-Turkish sentiments are clearly visible on streets. Many people in Turkish-controlled zones in North Syria are demanding the withdrawal of Turkish forces, exacerbating the already volatile situation. At some places Turkish-trained Syrian opposition forces fired at Turkish armoured vehicles, prompting Turkey to deploy additional troops to the region to maintain control. As a result of the confrontations many people were killed and injured in exchanges of fire with Turkish troops as per Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, a war monitor. Turkish President Erdogan recently said that “There is no reason not to establish relations with Syria”. He also emphasized while speaking to reporters that Ankara has no plans or goals to interfere in Syria's internal affairs. What he said is in total contradiction to what Turks are doing in Syria since the start of Syrian conflict in 2011.
Many senior Syrian opposition figures now are of the view that Ankara has abandoned the Syrian revolution. Turkey has been one of the main backers of the Syrian opposition groups since the start of Syrian conflict and supported the overthrow of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. But, in reality Turks always used the Syrian conflict next door just to serve their own vested interests. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has sold the Syrian opposition on many occasions since 2016, allowing the Assad regime to reoccupy many areas controlled by Turkish-backed groups. Ankara’s initial policy in the Syrian civil war was ostensibly in support of the moderate Syrian opposition. However, Turkey opened its borders to foreign fighters who travelled to Syria via Turkey in 2012 and 2013 and fuelled extremist groups, including ISIS. Emergence of ISIS irked the international community and in turn they reduced support for the Turkish backed rebels and shifted focus to helping groups fighting Islamic State, such as the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG). Turkey then readjusted its policy in Syria and pushed the mostly Arab Syrian rebels to fight the Kurds. Throughout the conflict the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has been the armed opposition group mostly aligned with and most dependent on Turkey.
After 2015, when Turkey shifted to its strategy of containing the PYD/YPG led Syrian Kurds by creating buffer zones in northern Syria. It used FSA groups as irregular forces in its hybrid military operations: Operation Euphrates Shield, 2016, Operation Olive Branch, 2018, and Operation Peace Spring, 2019. These groups were renamed as the Syrian National Army (SNA). Turkey supplies the SNA with training, salaries and weapons in exchange for its participation in Turkish military operations. These groups were also comfortable with collaborating with Turkey and supporting Turkish operations against the Kurdish forces east of the Euphrates River. As in exchange they were getting Turkey’s support in fortifying and defending parts of north-western Syria. Not only this, Turks also used these Syrian opposition groups in places like Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh as cannon fodder. Unfortunately, these groups didn’t realise that they are playing in the hands of Turks and it’s just a matter of time that they will also be sold by Ankara. Turkey followed a divide-and-rule policy in Syria in which as per the requirements they fielded Syrians against each other. In sum, Turkey’s vision of resurrecting the ‘revolutionary’ cause in the Syrian civil war for its own benefit, has been effectively executed through institutionalised control over the Syrian opposition groups.
Today Turkey is open to a new era of ties with the Syrian government of Bashar-Al-Assad only to serve its greater strategic interests. The Syrian opposition, meanwhile, appears to be merely a sideshow for Turkey. It is unlikely that the opposition will accept the settlement between Turkey and Syria without clear and specific commitments and a regional political cover for issues related to a potential political and constitutional change in Syria. But Turkey would not allow their higher-order interests to be governed by client groups like-Syrian opposition. Ankara will try to contain key Syrian opposition armed factions and possibly eliminate those it suspects of opposing its new agenda.
At this point in time the most suitable option for opposition groups is to join forces with the Kurds in northern Syria and form a joint political and military command. This would give Arab and Kurdish opposition groups control over roughly 35-40 percent of Syrian territory and a sizable part of the total population. Despite the animosities that developed between Arabs and Kurds during the previous war years it will be mutually beneficial to form such an alliance if the alternative is their political demise. The United States most probably will also consider supporting this alliance, especially given its efforts in the past to unite the Kurds and to include them in the Syrian Negotiating Committee, as well as its call for the revitalization of trade between Kurdish- and opposition-controlled regions.
(The author is a columnist and geopolitical analyst for Middle-East and Af-Pak region and can be reached at manishraiva@gmail.com)
Many senior Syrian opposition figures now are of the view that Ankara has abandoned the Syrian revolution. Turkey has been one of the main backers of the Syrian opposition groups since the start of Syrian conflict and supported the overthrow of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. But, in reality Turks always used the Syrian conflict next door just to serve their own vested interests. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has sold the Syrian opposition on many occasions since 2016, allowing the Assad regime to reoccupy many areas controlled by Turkish-backed groups. Ankara’s initial policy in the Syrian civil war was ostensibly in support of the moderate Syrian opposition. However, Turkey opened its borders to foreign fighters who travelled to Syria via Turkey in 2012 and 2013 and fuelled extremist groups, including ISIS. Emergence of ISIS irked the international community and in turn they reduced support for the Turkish backed rebels and shifted focus to helping groups fighting Islamic State, such as the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG). Turkey then readjusted its policy in Syria and pushed the mostly Arab Syrian rebels to fight the Kurds. Throughout the conflict the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has been the armed opposition group mostly aligned with and most dependent on Turkey.
After 2015, when Turkey shifted to its strategy of containing the PYD/YPG led Syrian Kurds by creating buffer zones in northern Syria. It used FSA groups as irregular forces in its hybrid military operations: Operation Euphrates Shield, 2016, Operation Olive Branch, 2018, and Operation Peace Spring, 2019. These groups were renamed as the Syrian National Army (SNA). Turkey supplies the SNA with training, salaries and weapons in exchange for its participation in Turkish military operations. These groups were also comfortable with collaborating with Turkey and supporting Turkish operations against the Kurdish forces east of the Euphrates River. As in exchange they were getting Turkey’s support in fortifying and defending parts of north-western Syria. Not only this, Turks also used these Syrian opposition groups in places like Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh as cannon fodder. Unfortunately, these groups didn’t realise that they are playing in the hands of Turks and it’s just a matter of time that they will also be sold by Ankara. Turkey followed a divide-and-rule policy in Syria in which as per the requirements they fielded Syrians against each other. In sum, Turkey’s vision of resurrecting the ‘revolutionary’ cause in the Syrian civil war for its own benefit, has been effectively executed through institutionalised control over the Syrian opposition groups.
Today Turkey is open to a new era of ties with the Syrian government of Bashar-Al-Assad only to serve its greater strategic interests. The Syrian opposition, meanwhile, appears to be merely a sideshow for Turkey. It is unlikely that the opposition will accept the settlement between Turkey and Syria without clear and specific commitments and a regional political cover for issues related to a potential political and constitutional change in Syria. But Turkey would not allow their higher-order interests to be governed by client groups like-Syrian opposition. Ankara will try to contain key Syrian opposition armed factions and possibly eliminate those it suspects of opposing its new agenda.
At this point in time the most suitable option for opposition groups is to join forces with the Kurds in northern Syria and form a joint political and military command. This would give Arab and Kurdish opposition groups control over roughly 35-40 percent of Syrian territory and a sizable part of the total population. Despite the animosities that developed between Arabs and Kurds during the previous war years it will be mutually beneficial to form such an alliance if the alternative is their political demise. The United States most probably will also consider supporting this alliance, especially given its efforts in the past to unite the Kurds and to include them in the Syrian Negotiating Committee, as well as its call for the revitalization of trade between Kurdish- and opposition-controlled regions.
(The author is a columnist and geopolitical analyst for Middle-East and Af-Pak region and can be reached at manishraiva@gmail.com)
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