During the recently partially concluded US-Iran war, Iran and its proxies in Iraq have conducted over 850 missile and drone attacks in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Iran launched thousands of projectiles at Israel and the Gulf states, which received wider international attention. However, the attacks in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) by Iranians and their proxies have received less attention. Compared to Iranian reprisals against other U.S. partners, these attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan have been qualitatively distinct. In Kurdistan, Iranian projectiles have largely gone unchallenged due to the absence of comparable air defence capabilities, unlike in other parts of the region where the vast majority have been intercepted. These attacks are not intended to undermine the American war effort by inducing global economic damage, as we witness in the case of Iranian attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure. And unlike the barrages directed at Israel, they are not reprisals for their involvement in the conflict either. Instead, Iranian attacks on the KRI are an effort to compel one of America's closest partners in the region to abandon it, to oust the United States from its final remaining foothold in Iraq, and to strengthen Iranian influence over its immediate neighbours. 

Iran's strikes against the Iranian Kurdish groups based in KRI should not be interpreted as a pre-emptive containment of these dissident groups. The KRI's ongoing targeting, even after the ceasefire brokered by Qatar, suggests a deeper agenda. Kurdistan is the most prosperous and stable region of Iraq. Kurdistan's strong ties with the United States and its assistance in counterterrorism have sustained this situation. The region now hosts all 2,500 U.S.-led coalition forces deployed at Harir Air Base and Erbil International Airport, following Iraq's declaration of the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from its federal territory. Additionally, with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) announcing a $100 billion energy deal with two additional American companies, i.e., Chevron and ExxonMobil, in 2025, they hold substantial stakes in the region. Moreover, Kurdistan is the sole region in Iraq in which Iran and its affiliated militias have been unable to establish a substantial political and economic presence. Since October 7, 2023, Iran's proxy groups in the Middle East have significantly diminished. As a result of Israeli operations that have significantly damaged Hamas and Hezbollah, Tehran has become increasingly dependent on its allies within Iraq's PMF, who have remained relatively unscathed. Iraqi Kurdistan became the primary battleground for the PMF to target U.S. troops, interests, and partners, especially since the United States pulled out of northeast Syria. Senior U.S. officials already acknowledge that Iraq has become a “major proxy battleground” between Washington and Tehran. 

The Iranian objective is regrettably being facilitated by the absence of a substantive American response and support for the KRG in the wake of these attacks. In its policy toward the Kurds, the United States has been motivated by strategic considerations, supporting Kurdish aspirations only when they are consistent with its objectives. It has been a recurring pattern of Kurdish empowerment that is fleeting, followed by instability and a reversal of autonomy. The KRG has been one of Washington's most reliable partners in the Middle East. It has helped with counterterrorism efforts and made the region more stable. By permitting it to become vulnerable in the aftermath of this conflict, the United States would erode its credibility and impair one of the few functional Western-aligned governance models in the region. In Iraq, there should be no existential hazards associated with a commitment to partnership with the United States. A proven partner in promoting regional stability, the Kurds are one of the last viable pillars of U.S. influence in Iraq. By permitting its weakening, Tehran would achieve a strategic victory that would be exceedingly challenging, if not impossible, to reverse. 

KRI-US relations are currently at a critical juncture. Tensions are increasing because of the changing priorities of the United States, although a shared history fosters a bond. This precarious situation has the potential to result in violence, instability, and humanitarian crises or to reverse the political, economic, and security gains that the Kurds have achieved. This setback would not only remove a key security partner for the West, but it would also hinder the spread of democracy in a region ruled by authoritarian regimes. It could also have a substantial impact on America's global reputation as a dependable ally. Consequently, the United States must demonstrate more dedication to the KRI's defence. The first step in this direction will be to equip the region with air defence systems that can intercept drones and missiles launched by Iran and its proxies. The KRG officials have been seeking such support for a long time, but they are frequently frustrated by bureaucratic constraints that necessitate approval from the federal government in Baghdad, even for defensive capabilities. Additionally, Washington should take a proactive approach towards establishing a long-term agreement between Baghdad and Erbil regarding the management and exportation of oil, budget allocation, and power sharing. Since the United States has substantial diplomatic, political, and financial influence over the Iraqi government, the US can put pressure on Baghdad to accept the legitimate demands of the KRG. To guarantee the KRG's stability and its capacity to function as a regional security partner, it is imperative to resolve its chronic financial issues. 

  

(The author is an Australian geopolitical analyst and columnist for the Middle East)